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Introduction 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States found itself in a peculiar position. Defining 
itself as a nation of liberty, still recovering from a destructive civil war to cement its unity and 
equality, and proud of its long policy history of trade instead of arms as its method of international 
relations, the country suddenly found itself militarily subduing an empire spanning half the globe. 
This was not so much an empire of conquest as it was one of convenience or perhaps, as it was 
seen then, serendipity. Once gained, however, the United States immediately began to struggle 
with how to manage this empire and what to eventually do with it. This paper will deal with this 
struggle as it pertains to U.S. policy toward the Philippine islands. Specifically, I will focus upon 
the initial formation of U.S. policy toward its Philippine possession and how that policy evolved 
and was interpreted by various presidents and legislatures until ultimate independence was 
granted in 1946. As the United States today continues to be involved in the possession and 
(re)construction of countries, the insights into the political and economic tides that swayed U.S. 
policy toward the Philippines are useful in understanding the forces that affect U.S. policy in other 
international interventions today.  
Within the period of U.S. possession I will attempt to draw out three basic camps motivating 
various policy interpretations. The first is the independence camp, or those who fought for the 
United States to grant Philippine independence either immediately, or with a defined date. The 
opposing camp contained those dedicated to the long delay if not elimination of the idea of 
Philippine independence in favor of U.S. continued dominance. The third position is that of 
economic interest which was strictly in favor of policy benefiting the United States economically 
regardless of the question of independence. What I will show is that all of these camps co-existed 
throughout the 50 year discussion of how to deal with the Philippines, and that their relative 
strength, and thus influence on the interpretation of U.S. policy had very little to do with the state 
of the Philippines themselves, but were directly tied to international events and their impact on 
U.S. domestic politics.  
The story of how the United States, with no established policy of imperial expansion, came to find 
itself in possession of the Philippines provides a good picture of a country struggling to identify its 
place in the world. The U.S. seizure of the Philippines ultimately had less to do with U.S. interests 
in Asia and more to do with interests in the Caribbean. Agricultural interest in Cuba predated the 
Civil War when southern Democrats began to suggest acquiring the Spanish possession of Cuba 
to increase available slave territory.[1] That is not to say that the United States had no interests in 
Asia. Clearly the United States’ opening of Japan to trade, establishing trade with China under 
the treaty port system, and nearly coming to open conflict with Britain and Germany over 
possession of the Samoan islands made clear its interests afar as well as closer to home.[2] The 
19th century was defined as a period of great expansion and though the essay Manifest Destiny 
was not published until 1885 the rapid expansion of the frontier to the Pacific Ocean and then 
beyond to Hawaii and other Pacific Islands showed the idea was fundamental to American 
character.[3] In this era the idea of America possessing superior racial, moral, and political 
qualities seemed to demand that if the world was to be carved up into empires, the United States 
had a right, and almost an obligation, to participate.[4] Although the Monroe doctrine, established 
in 1823, was intended to prevent previous Spanish colonies in the Americas from being re-
colonized by other European powers, it was no great leap of the imagination to see all of these 
former European colonies now as American protectorates and so not very far from an empire.[5]  
Thus when U.S. agricultural interests in Spanish Cuba began to be threatened by Spain’s brutal 
suppression of a prolonged Cuban independence movement, it was clearly consistent with 
American regional and economic interests to intervene. America notified Spain that if it could not 
create peaceful conditions for U.S. business in Cuba, America would.[6] This willingness to 
become involved also stemmed from the growing American public support to aid an 
independence movement seeking to throw off the bonds of tyranny as had been done farther 
North in 1776.[7] This mix of idealistic fervor and realist calculation would continue on to color the 
U.S. vision of Philippine retention after the Spanish-American War.  
April 24, 1898 the United States declared war on Spain but along with the declaration of war, 
Congress had approved the Teller resolution that specified Cuba was to be liberated and given 
independence, not annexed to the United States.[8] This amendment had been added specifically 
by anti-imperialistic Democratic Congressmen in response to overwhelming public opinion 
supporting Cuba libre, or a free Cuba, but it ran counter to prevailing American policy regarding 
Cuba which had always considered it a desirable territory for both business and national 
defense.[9] Regardless of the intent of the amendment, which the Congress and President 
McKinley were forced to approve to appease public demands, the McKinley administration 
proceeded to deconstruct the document and latch onto the requirement for “pacification” before 
independence upon which to justify continued U.S. possession of the island. Pacification was re-
interpreted as stable government, which was argued could take generations.[10] Even the later 
Platt amendment which in name gave independence to Cuba, in reality reflected more U.S. 
business and security interests by retaining sovereignty over matters of Cuban defense and 
economics.[11] This was the beginning of a period where U.S. imperialist interests prevailed. With 
the Philippines we see a similar story and similar outcome.  
Anticipating a possible war with Spain, the War Department had created orders directing 
Commodore Dewey to destroy the Spanish fleet anchored in Manila at the onset of hostilities to 
prevent these ships from being brought into the conflict in Cuba.[12] The additional advantage of 
sinking the Spanish fleet in Manila was to deprive Spain of income from the colony and to hold 
Manila as a bargaining chip in peace negotiations should it be needed.[13] Unable to annex Cuba 
as a spoil of war, however, the Philippines began to be seen as a desired prize and one that the 
United States almost had no choice in keeping. Once the United States had possession of the 
Philippines at the end of the war, it had three options. It could return the colony to Spain which 
would be seen as humiliating to the United States having just fought against Spanish tyranny. It 
could immediately grant independence to the Philippines, but similar to Cuba, after hundreds of 
years of Spanish colonial oppression it was in no position to withstand the imperial designs of 
other colonial powers seeking territory in Asia such as Germany and Japan.[14] Finally the United 
States could maintain possession of Philippine sovereignty while tutoring the country in 
government until it could stand on its own.[15] Again we see the same argument that stemmed 
from the idea of “pacification” in Cuba being used to provide a moral obligation to bring 
enlightenment and the stability of democratic ideals and government. The argument over whether 
or not to keep the Philippines contained all the interests that would continue to influence U.S. 
policy in the islands until their independence.  
In the Congressional debate over approval of the Treaty of Paris ending the Spanish-American 
war and the debate immediately after to clarify U.S. policy towards the Philippines after 
sovereignty had passed to the United States, domestic politics played a large part. Democrats, 
eager for a position from which they might politically defeat the Republican majority soon lined up 
behind immediate Philippine independence holding aloft the Declaration of Independence and 
asking whether or not Republicans knew about its provisions. Republicans touted the economic 
advantage of creating an exclusive market for U.S. products which was presented as the solution 
to the economic depression of the early 1890s.[16] Additionally, and perhaps most effectively, 
Republicans took the moral high ground declaring it America’s responsibility, now that it found 
itself in possession of the Philippines, to bring stability and democracy before possibly 
considering independence.[17] Finally, in a feat of self-serving politics, Democratic Congressman 
William Jennings Bryant led a defection and approved the Paris treaty in order to end the war with 
Spain and to separate the issue of Philippine independence for his later use against the 
Republicans in his presidential campaign platform.[18] Thus sovereignty over the Philippines 
passed from Spain to the United States. But the question remained, what would be the eventual 
destiny of the Philippines? Would they become a state of the union, a member of an American 
commonwealth, or an independent state?  
Soon after treaty ratification, the passing of the McEnery resolution with the Bacon amendment 
would have established U.S. policy toward the Philippines similar to that of its policy toward Cuba, 
full independence. Its defeat in the House left open continued possession and possible 
commonwealth status, but racial, geostrategic, and economic factors made statehood very 
unlikely for the Philippines. Annexation of the Philippine islands would have made it our largest 
and most populous state, added ten percent to the total population of the United States, and 
created an enormous ethnic minority offensive to current Darwinian ideas about European racial 
superiority.[19] Though McKinley utilized racial superiority in declaring American responsibility to 
uplift the lesser Filipinos, both sides of the aisle understood that this argument would only 
accomplish preventing early independence.[20] Granting citizenship, besides adding an 
enormous ethnic minority to the U.S. population, would dump millions of unskilled laborers into 
the U.S. workforce as well as inexpensive products from that labor. U.S. business therefore 
opposed annexation of the Philippines, yet at the same time desired access to both its market for 
the sale of excess U.S. production and its resources including agricultural land and minerals. 
Finally it was recognized that possession of the Philippines would commit the United States to its 
defense and inevitable conflicts extraneous to current U.S. commitments.[21]  
Forces against annexation of the Philippines came from all sides, but did not translate into 
overwhelming desire to rid the United States of the possession. They did however motivate the 
first Congressional legislation to show the intent of the Congress in Philippine affairs. The Foraker 
amendment to the Army appropriations bill of 1899 made clear that while the United States 
occupied the Philippines they should not be exploited in the manner of European colonial 
precedent.[22] The bottom line, however, was that the United States retained sovereignty over 
the Philippines, and policy toward its ultimate disposition could always change. For Republicans 
and McKinley that was enough for now.  
U.S. presidential elections in 1900 between McKinley and Bryan saw independence of the 
Philippines as a major issue with Republicans taking both an idealistic “high road” as well as an 
economic trade interest dominated “low road” in arguing for continuing sovereignty over the 
Philippines.[23] Bryan’s tactic of approving the Treaty of Paris in order to utilize a platform of 
Philippine independence to win the greater prize of the presidency backfired. With McKinley’s 
victory came a mandate for retention of the Philippines and the continuation of efforts to make 
this retention permanent.[24]  
On September 1st, 1900 with the effective end of the rebellion in the Philippines, implementation 
of U.S. governance of the islands passed from the U.S. military government to McKinley’s 
appointee William Howard Taft as the first governor general.[25] Though appointed by McKinley 
he would continue to receive support from Roosevelt after the elections of 1901. Initially against 
retention of the Philippines, Taft soon changed his mind and set out with a determined single-
mindedness to implement plans that would help ensure a prolonged U.S. possession. Taft would 
dominate U.S.-Philippine policy for the next 13 years, first as governor general, then head of the 
War Department, and finally as U.S. president. Taft set about creating local government in the 
Philippines with the intent of eventual self government, but he also pushed for economic and 
trade policies that would tie the United States and Philippines closer together. With one hand he 
established local Filipino government by co-opting local social elites which reduced motivation for 
the remaining insurgency and brought a larger measure of stability, with the other he pushed for 
conditions favorable to massive U.S. investment in the Philippines in order to gain business 
interests favorable to retention. Stable government and profitable trade, it was thought, would 
undermine the argument for Philippine independence and turn opinion favorably toward 
retention.[26]  
The local government was drawn from the newly created Partido Federalista. This was a group of 
educated pro-U.S. elites with little public base of support who saw their interests best served by a 
continued U.S. presence. This along with the sedition law, which criminalized the promotion of 
Philippine independence until after the final suppression of the insurrection, gave a picture much 
like other European colonies, one which creates stability but for the purposes of the imperial 
power not the people of the colony.[27] As H.W. Brands put it:  
Yet even in the case of the illustrados (Filipino educated elite), and as a general principle, the 
United States ran the Philippines in the interests of Americans, specifically Americans informed 
and energetic enough to seize the appropriate levers of power in Washington. Any connection 
between these interests and those of the Filipino people at large—or, for that matter, of the 
American people at large—was basically coincidental.[28] 
In order to create the conditions necessary for substantial U.S. investment in the Philippines, Taft 
set about eliminating trade tariffs between the two countries. When the Supreme Court ruled in 
1901 that insular governments did not fall within the tariff wall but could be given special 
schedules, Taft set out for Washington to personally lobby. Ideally he wanted free trade, but a 
reduction of 50 to 75% would give Philippine products the competitive edge in the United States 
to inspire business investment in the Philippines. Although Republicans still held the majority in 
Congress, they were also the party of protectionism who had put the large tariff barriers in place 
to protect U.S. industry. Thus the Republicans found a conflict between their intent in the 
Philippines to prevent independence, and their commitment to business interests. In trying to 
convince them Taft explicitly explained that free trade would create a preferential trading system 
that would attract investment and make the Philippines reluctant to remove itself from this 
privileged trade by becoming independent. Roosevelt signed into law a 25% tariff reduction for 
the Philippines in 1902, far less than Taft had desired.[29] Tariff reduction, however would be an 
issue that Taft would return to in his later offices.  
Perhaps the most critical piece of legislation approved by Congress to prevent the exploitation of 
the Philippines and create conditions favorable to future independence was the Organic Act 
passed in 1902. Though it took four congressional sessions of bitter partisanship fighting to 
conclude, the act contained three cornerstone restrictions on Philippine exploitation. The first 
restricted foreign land holdings by a corporation to only 2500 acres in order to prevent massive 
plantation development. The second gave specific restrictions on mining claims limiting them to 
one per individual or corporation, and to a size of one thousand square feet. In both the land and 
mining restrictions having a holding prohibited an individual or corporation from having any other 
agricultural or mining interest at the same time. The final major effect of the act was to refuse the 
extension of the U.S. banking system to the Philippines which would have provided direct access 
to U.S. capital.[30] These restrictions, consistent with Republican protectionism, gave Taft, 
Roosevelt, and anti-independence leaders who followed a conflict between desires and available 
actions. The attempt to circumvent these restrictions would eventually help to change the party in 
power and with it the course of U.S. policy in the Philippines. Before that, however, U.S. security 
policy with respect to the Philippines came to the forefront near the end of Roosevelt’s first term.  
The beginning of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904 brought back to the forefront concerns over 
the security of the Philippines, and U.S. obligations. The U.S. battle fleet was currently stationed 
in the Atlantic, and the Japanese crushing victory over the Russians in Tsushima highlighted the 
inadvisability of splitting a battle fleet between oceans.[31] Previous security concerns had only 
involved Germany who had taken possession of multiple islands along steaming routes to the 
Philippines, but the land and sea victories of Japan over Russia starkly highlighted the woeful 
Philippine defense against such an adversary.[32] With Congress unwilling to substantially fund 
military bases or a fleet to defend the islands, Roosevelt began to have grave misgivings over the 
future retention of the Philippines. So serious were his doubts about the ability of the United 
States to defend it, he made an agreement with the Japanese government recognizing the 
legitimacy of Japan’s interests in Korea in exchange for non-interference in the Philippines.[33] 
With U.S. security policy eventually to settle on defense of the Philippines from forces stationed in 
Hawaii, Roosevelt seriously considers granting independence in 1908 to eliminate this lingering 
vulnerability.[34] Roosevelt’s successor, however, was not quite so ready to part with his dream 
of empire.  
After William Taft was elected president in 1908 he set about tariff revision for the Philippines 
which had eluded him as governor general and head of the War Department. Roosevelt had 
failed to push through Philippine tariff reform in each of the last four years of his administration as 
American sugar beet and tobacco interests fought to keep tariff protection against Philippine 
products.[35] Taft not only pushed through a tariff reform package, but in 1909 established a 
mostly reciprocal free trade agreement between the United States and Philippines. He did this, 
however, against the desires of the Philippine congress.[36] At this point the elected officials in 
the Philippines had developed from their initial pro-U.S. position to one that demanded 
independence even if the timeline was uncertain due to the developmental needs of the islands. 
These leaders, including one who would become the voice of Philippine politics until 
independence, Manuel Quezon, strongly objected to this free trade agreement. Quezon 
recognized that free trade with the United States would inhibit Philippine industry by flooding the 
market with U.S. products while at the same time inspire massive U.S. investment in the 
Philippines to take advantage of its land and cheap labor. These two together would inexorably 
create a Philippine dependency upon the United States that would deny its independence.[37] 
What the Philippines continued to search and lobby for, were preferential tariffs favoring 
Philippine development, not free trade or equal tariffs.[38] Taft approved the measure over the 
objections of the Philippine congress and moved on to the second requirement necessary to 
invite U.S. capital, large land holdings.  
A legacy of the dominance of the Catholic Church in Philippine affairs under Spanish colonial rule 
was the ownership of large tracks of undeveloped land by the church itself. In order to eliminate 
the power of the church on the islands and promote agricultural development and land ownership, 
Taft purchased this land from the Vatican in 1903 and set up a system to sell plots to Filipinos.[39] 
Although congress had specifically called for the same restrictions on sale of these lands to 
foreign investors as they had on other agricultural lands, Taft utilized a favorable U.S. attorney 
general reinterpretation in 1909 to approve the sale of 50,000 acres to the American Sugar 
Refining Company, who likely sponsored the attorney general’s decision.[40] Clearly Taft had to 
see this as the culmination of his plans to prevent the independence of the islands. Philippine 
officials quickly condemned the sale regarding it as exploitation, as did the U.S. Congress whose 
Democrats utilized this event as well as the practice of U.S. insular government employees using 
their position to advantageously purchase land and mineral rights, to reinvigorate the 
independence camp and help bring about a crushing defeat for Republicans in the 1911 House 
elections.[41] Taft’s 13 year struggle to establish conditions favoring a retention policy toward the 
Philippines would largely come to an end the next year as Woodrow Wilson’s victory for the 
presidency would bring about Democratic domination in the government until 1921.  
Wilson and his appointed governor general Francis Burton Harrison would proceed to undo most 
of the Taft era policies and reset the Philippines on course toward independence. Much of the 
determination to do so, however, stemmed not from idealistic anti-colonial sentiment, but from a 
practical recommendation from Wilson’s close associate Henry Jones Ford who toured the 
Philippines in 1912 and concluded that Wilson’s choices were between revolt or further political 
autonomy and eventual independence.[42] With Wilson’s direction, Harrison set about a complete 
overhaul of the Philippine insular government in 1913 including the creation of an upper house of 
congress, and the “Filipinization” of government positions which had continued to be 
overwhelmingly held by Americans.[43] This was a complete reversal in policy implementation as 
Taft had worked to concentrate power in the hands of the U.S. governor general and prevent 
authority from transferring to the Philippine assembly or Filipinos in general.[44] Unfortunately, 
the insular government at the time of Harrison’s changes, continued to be made up of Filipino 
elites from various regions of the country. Though policies originating as far back as Taft’s first 
term as governor general had attempted to build impersonal democratic institutions, Filipino 
culture remained, as it always had been, devoted to personal “kinship networks.”[45] As power 
transferred more and more to the new two house insular congress, these elites became 
entrenched in government in effect creating a type of oligarchic control of Philippine politics 
concerned more with preservation of their own power than with the interests of the islands.[46] 
This would later lead to the widely publicized corruption and failure of the Philippine Bank as well 
as an associated currency crisis following World War One. Harrison accepted these failures as 
normal parts of new democracy and compared them to similar problems during the Grant 
administration but they would extract a political price.[47] The First World War also inspired 
further clarification of U.S. policy in the Philippines by the U.S. Congress.  
The beginning of WWI renewed concern over the vulnerability of the United States in the 
Philippines bringing voices from both sides of the aisle in Congress to call for immediate 
withdrawal from the Philippines and cutting of all ties.[48] Though these were extreme views, the 
war did allow the opportunity to begin debate on a bill introduced by House Democrat William 
Jones, head of the committee on insular affairs. The Jones measure would finally put in writing 
the policy of the U.S. government toward the Philippines as that of eventual granting of 
independence. The bill would remain in debate until 1916 but even though it established no 
timetable for independence, like the Teller amendment, it finally established a U.S. declaration of 
intent.[49] The Philippine insular government approved of the measure largely because it 
appeased their constituencies who demanded independence while allowing them opportunity to 
delay independence and preserve their trade privilege under U.S. sovereignty.[50]  
The war itself was beneficial to the islands. Massive war demand fueled large income surpluses 
which the government used to invest in heavy industry including cement, coal, and steel.[51] 
Unfortunately this focus on national industrial development came with large amounts of corruption 
and at the expense of smaller local government improvements which would have had a more 
lasting effect.[52]  
Following the war, the ensuing failure of the Philippine national bank, related currency crisis 
forcing peso devaluation, and recognition of the high level of government corruption discredited 
Harrison’s handling of the Philippines and put in question the readiness of Filipinos for self 
government.[53] Together with the failure of the U.S. Congress to approve the Treaty of 
Versailles or the League of Nations, Democrats in general lost credibility and were replaced by a 
Republicans majority in both houses in 1918 and the election of President Harding in 1921.  
Though Republicans were not willing to attempt a repeal of the Jones Act, the open ended Jones 
law allowed a return to Taft era policies. In order to show necessity for these policies, Harding 
dispatched a commission headed by the former governor general under Taft to determine the 
readiness of the Philippines for self government and independence. Unsurprisingly this report, 
delivered in 1921, found the islands far from prepared for self rule.[54] Leonard Wood, the second 
member of Harding’s team investigating the Philippines, was rewarded with the general 
governorship. Republican Taft-era policies to attract U.S. capital to the Philippines would continue 
through the Coolidge years and well into the Hoover administration despite continued U.S. 
congressional pressure for independence or a scheduled plebiscite.[55] It would take another 
external event to turn U.S. policy back toward near term independence.  
The Wall Street crash of 1929 motivated Congress to enact the Smoot-Hawley Act. This 
legislation raised protective tariffs and initiated a world trade war which would eventually 
aggravate an economic downturn into the Great Depression of the 1930s. As the economy 
worsened, protectionist interests turned their eye on the Philippines. Business lined up on both 
sides of the debate. Industry that used sugar pressed for retention of the Philippines to keep 
prices down while U.S. sugar producers demanded immediate independence in order to place the 
Philippines behind the tariff wall and help lift sugar prices.[56] Those opposed to independence 
were not so naïve as to promote forced retention, but instead pushed the idea of a Philippine 
plebiscite at the end of an extended period of commonwealth in order to give the Philippine 
citizens the ability to vote on their future. While this seemed wholesomely democratic, the 
underlying premise of this policy was to use the intervening years to create a condition of 
dependency after which the Filipino citizens would have no choice but to vote for continued 
commonwealth. Those truly pushing for independence reversed the order demanding that if a 
plebiscite were to occur it should be at the beginning of a transition period leading to full 
independence.[57]  
Various bills were introduced and debated in Congress until finally in 1932 the Hare-Hawes-
Cutting Act was passed providing for a 10 year commonwealth transition period before full 
independence. The act was passed even over Hoover’s presidential veto largely due to continued 
recognition of its strategic vulnerability to Japan, growing depression era racist violence toward 
foreign labor, and business pressure to push the Philippines behind the tariff wall.[58] All that was 
left was for the Filipino insular government, who had built their public support on the fight for 
independence, to approve the act for it to go into effect. Unfortunately, local Filipino politics 
between Quezon and his rival Sergio Osmeña led to its ultimate rejection largely in order to push 
for more favorable trade conditions for the Philippines during the transition.[59] At this point it was 
the United States which was searching for a way to earn independence from the Philippines.[60]  
Since Quezon had led the defeat of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting legislation largely due to the fact that 
his rival had been the one to create the deal in Washington, Quezon traveled to the United States 
to work a better deal and restore his political capitol which had lost a great deal of value during 
his perceived fight against the independence act. However with the election of Franklin Roosevelt, 
Quezon’s mission to seek a better treaty had the advantage of a Democratic president and 
majorities in both houses. The result was the Tydings-McDuffie Act, approved in 1934, with the 
only major change being the elimination of U.S. military bases and negotiations on maintaining 
naval bases to occur after independence.[61] With this bill U.S. interpretation of its destiny with 
the Philippines had been decided. The United States would not remember itself as an imperial 
power focused upon the exploitation of its possessions, but would see in its history with the 
Philippines a great power who sought to lift up and democratize an oppressed colony of Spain. 
The decision to finally grant independence had great consequences for the Philippines even 
before independence was finally observed.  
The struggle to pass Philippine independence legislation had brought together a vast array of 
interests including idealistic anti-imperialists, protectionist business leaders, and defense experts. 
Once the decision for independence was finally made, regardless of the period of commonwealth, 
the United States largely washed its hands from intervening in Philippine matters. Democracy in 
the commonwealth government was slowly compromised by the personality of Quezon and the 
increased separation between the government elites and the citizens facilitated by coconut oil 
revenues. These millions of dollars delivered by the United States in response to Quezon’s 
promise to use the funds to help transition to independence instead facilitated reduction in 
personal income taxes and thus reduction of government accountability while at the same time 
cementing public support for Quezon.[62] The growing centralization of power in Quezon’s 
commonwealth presidency did not go unnoticed in Washington, but there was simply no political 
will to intervene.[63] Likewise when it became apparent that the windfall millions of dollars 
accrued to the commonwealth government from coconut oil taxes were not used, as promised, to 
prepare the country for tariff preference elimination, Washington took no action other than official 
protest.[64] Likewise the United States had largely written off defense of the Philippines in case of 
Japanese invasion in its refusal to fund base construction in Guam, instead preferring to station 
forces in Hawaii.[65] The United States had one more chance to intervene in Philippine affairs 
immediately following World War Two but again, preferred not to intervene allowing the 
independence timeline to run its course.  
With the return of U.S. forces to the Philippines following Japanese occupation the problem of 
how to handle reconstruction and members of government who had collaborated with the 
Japanese were paramount. To be truly effective at rebuilding the country and removing 
collaborators from government the United States would have had to intervene directly thus re-
asserting its sovereignty over the territory to not only repair damaged infrastructure, but repair the 
damaged democratic government by prosecution of collaborators and reducing the power of the 
executive.[66] Though Roosevelt directed the removal of collaborators from political or economic 
office, he left the implementation to the commonwealth government which was wholly unable to 
do so while trying to recover from the war.[67] Manila, as Karnow points out, “after Warsaw, was 
the most destroyed allied city of World War II.”[68] It has also been proposed that MacArthur, 
while still maintaining military control over the country, could have used his authority to break up 
the oligarchic government establishment while at the same time dealing with collaborators.[69] 
Most likely he would have not had enough political flexibility, even in war, to accomplish these 
goals. Despite its doubts with the democratic institutions and involvement of wartime 
collaborators, the United States preferred to maintain its policy and timeline for independence 
which found Osmeña becoming the first president of the country of the Philippines on 4 January 
1946.  
Until nearly the end of fifty years of Philippine possession, the United States was not able to 
effectively implement a coherent policy toward the islands in a way that advanced U.S. goals. 
Alongside proponents of imperial policy looking to extract wealth and resources from the 
Philippines stood those grounded in the belief that the Philippines represented a strategic 
vulnerability and threatened U.S. business and labor. This latter group had originally been 
characterized as believing that the United States had saved the Filipinos from oppression and 
had a moral responsibility to protect and provide instruction to the islands only until they were 
able to stand on their own. With hindsight this was mostly political rhetoric better used by those 
favoring retention, to mobilize public opinion for domestic politics. U.S. policy in the Philippines 
was never truly founded on anything other than perceived national interests. Economic interests, 
it seems, belonged to both camps with those who would have exploited Filipino resources on one 
side and U.S. business and labor who would have had to compete with Filipino products and 
immigrant labor on the other. What is clear from the examination of the development of U.S. 
policy toward the Philippines is that in large part the United States simply had no powerful 
motivation for maintaining a colonial interest, and as such that events in the islands themselves 
did not directly impact changes in U.S. politics but were destined to ride the waves of other larger 
influences such as war and economic depression.[70]  
The “in-between” policy slowly walked by the United States ensured that no benefit of possession 
of the Philippines would occur, but likely there were no benefits to be had. Had the United States 
chosen to pursue full European imperial style policy toward the Philippines, there is no doubt that 
the United States could have taken advantage of the rich resources of the islands. Military 
suppression of rebellion and administrative costs of doing so, however, would have likely 
balanced the ledger, or worse, as seen in some European colonial experiences of the era. Had 
the United States wholeheartedly chosen independence early with a longer term outlook in 
forming a stable independent trading and security partner such as U.S. policy in Japan and 
Germany perhaps a mutually beneficial long term relationship could have been formed. But in the 
period of isolationist thought the short term expense would have been politically prohibitive. 
Congress had refused funding to defend the Philippines as a U.S. possession and assuredly 
would have done so as an independent state. In addition, building democracy within a culture 
foreign to its principles and history is a far riskier endeavor than rebuilding a nation previously 
founded upon them. In the end the United States took advantage of an opportunity for empire but 
found within it the satisfaction of no lasting national interest.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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